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The Syndication And Financial Interest
Rules: Is It a "Prime Time" for a
Change?
by ROBERT M. OSHER*
I
Introduction
On July 21, 1982 the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) released a Notice of Proposed Rule Making (Notice),'
which would abolish the television network syndication and fi-
nancial interest rules (Rules).2 The Notice was the result of
the recommendation from an FCC study instituted in 1977,1
which was a "wide-ranging inquiry into commercial television
network business practices."4
The FCC undertook the study to determine the effect of its
rules on television network conduct. For some years, the FCC
has tried, where warranted, to reduce federal regulation of the
broadcasting industry. Nearly twenty years had passed since
the FCC had ordered such a broad inquiry into the broadcast
industry.' A special staff was created to study the syndication
and financial interest rules, which limit the three major net-
works (Networks) 6 to first run network broadcast profits. The
special staff recommended regulatory change.
The syndication rule prohibits the Networks from licensing,
distributing or selling programming to television stations for
* A.B., University of Southern California, 1981; J.D., Georgetown University Law
Center, 1984.
1. Amendment of the Commission's Syndication and Financial Interest Rule, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making in BC Docket No. 82-345, FCC 82-300, 47 Fed. Reg. 32,959
(1982) (hereinafter cited as Notice].
2. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(i), (ii) (1982).
3. Commercial Television Network Practices, 62 F.C.C.2d 548 (1977).
4. Notice, supra note 1, at para. 1.
5. Id.
6. "Network(s)" as used in this article refers to one or more of the three major
networks: American Broadcasting Company (ABC), National Broadcasting Company
(NBC), and Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS).
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non-network broadcast.7 The financial interest rule prohibits
the Networks from purchasing a financial or proprietary inter-
est in distribution, exhibition or other commercial use of any
television program produced in any part by an independent
producer. The Networks are limited to the right to broadcast
the program on Network telecasts.8 The effect of these Rules is
that the Networks must rent, rather than purchase, programs
for Network exhibition. 9
The basic fallacy underpinning the Rules is that the licens-
ing fee the Networks will be willing to pay for the syndication
right is less than the additional revenue the producer will be
able to accrue in the syndication market. The FCC believed
that by regulating certain Network practices, programming
wealth would be shifted to the program producer, who would
use the money to create diverse, quality programming. Ten
years after the Rules' promulgation, the special staff reported
that the "rule[s] [were] not necessary when adopted, and in
any event, could not possibly deter the practices that [these
rules were] designed to reach."'10
In its Notice, the FCC requested comments on the following
issues:
(1) the effect of the rules on the producers and networks
and their ability to spread financial risks and rewards;
(2) whether the rules in fact achieve any balancing or bar-
gaining power between the producer and network;
(3) whether the rules create a bargaining imbalance be-
tween the networks and non-network outlets to acquire and
make programming available through their various delivery
systems;
(4) the effect on the relationship of the FCC Rules and the
Justice Department consent decrees obtained against the
networks;
(5) what impact the deletion of the rules would have on the
independent television stations; and
(6) whether the protection of program producers from the
bargaining strength of the networks is the appropriate concern
of the commission."
Although the FCC requested comments on six distinct is-
7. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j)(i) (1982).
8. Id. § 73.658(j)(ii).
9. Id. § 73.658(j)(i), (ii).
10. Notice, supra note 1, at para. 2.
11. Id. at paras. 40-42.
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sues, 2 the major disputes between the Networks and produ-
cers are far more limited. Basically, the producers, opponents
of repeal, claim that independent television stations will be
harmed by the Networks' ability to "warehouse"-or hold off
the market-potential syndicated shows. 3 The theory is that
the diminishing supply of popular off-network programs weak-
ens the independent stations' ability to compete for sponsors,
thus creating higher advertising rates which further impair the
independent stations' ability to compete. 4 The Networks, pro-
ponents of repeal, claim that the FCC's justifications for enact-
ment of the Rules were questionable from the outset, and even
if originally correct, are no longer valid given today's television
market. 5 Furthermore, the Rules raise the cost of television
programming because of inherent risk-sharing inefficiencies
and encourage concentration of T.V. program protection, in-
stead of creating diversity as planned. 6 The Networks further
contend that there is no precedent or overwhelming financial
reason for them to warehouse off-network programs and thus
prevent their broadcast in syndication markets. 7
In its simplest terms, this is a battle of giants: the Networks
versus the large motion picture studios and other independent
producers of television programming. 8 The two financially
powerful sides are fighting over the lucrative syndication mar-
ket; the Networks want a share of the syndication pie. The
core of the syndication market is the off-network rerun of suc-
cessful network program series. The remainder of the syndica-
tion market consists of first-run shows especially created for
the syndication markets and foreign T.V. series.
Many of the arguments presented in this battle over syndica-
tion dollars are mutually destructive. Any attempt to reconcile
all of the arguments would be futile. No total resolution can be
achieved by logic itself; rather, the issues can be weighted to
favor either side if the television business is viewed as a con-
tinuum. Because of the very fluid nature of the business,
12. Notice, supra note 1, at 32,959-67.
13. ICF, INC., ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACTS OF REPEAL OF THE FINANCIAL INTEREST AND
SYNDICATION RULE 1-2, 1-3 (1983) [hereinafter cited as ICF REPORT].
14. Id.
15. Comments of National Broadcasting Co. in BC Docket No. 82-345, at 2 (1982)
[hereinafter cited as NBC Comments).
16. Notice, supra note 1, at paras. 29-31.
17. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 212.
18. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 28.
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strong arguments on behalf of a particular position may later
serve to undercut that position in another area of discussion.
This article focuses on whether the Rules actually solve the
problems they were created to correct. Conceding the Net-
works' dominant position as gatekeeper of the broadcast indus-
try, the author concludes that these particular Rules are not
the most efficient way to limit Network domination given to-
day's technologies and broadcast practices.
II
FCC Jurisdiction
A. History
Throughout the history of the FCC, the agency has instituted
investigative studies into television network practices. 9 The
Rules were promulgated in an era when television business
practices were much different from those of today.2" The FCC
could not have anticipated the explosive growth in technology
and the changes in the market relationship among the pro-
ducer, sponsor and Network. The history leading up to the
Rules' enactment demonstrates the FCC's systematic attempt
to limit Network dominance.
As early as 1938 the FCC was investigating network practices
in the radio industry.2 ' In 1941, the FCC issued the Report on
Chain Broadcasting.22 The resulting rules regulated the follow-
ing practices: "exclusive affiliation of stations, territorial exclu-
sivity, term of affiliation, option time, right to reject programs,
network ownership of stations, dual network operations, [and]
control by networks of station rates. 23 In 1946, these regula-
tions were extended to television.24
On other occasions, the FCC instituted studies into the T.V.
broadcast industry to determine if regulation of a business
practice was desirable. In particular, a 1965 Notice of Proposed
19. Notice, supra note 1, at para. 3.
20. Id. at para. 32.
21. Id. at para. 3.
22. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING in Docket No. 5060,40 RAD. REG. 2d (P &
F) 82 (1941).
23. NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FCC RULES GOVERNING COMMERCIAL TELEVI-
SION NETWORK PRACTICES (Preliminary Draft) (1979).
24. In 1977 the regulations were repealed, except those concerning territorial ex-
clusivity, for radio broadcasters. Review of Commission Rules and Regulatory Policies
Concerning Network Broadcasting by Standard AM and FM Stations, 63 F.C.C.2d 674
(1977). See also 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, infra note 38, at 62 n.125, 111.
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Rule Making25 stated:
The information and data before the Commission appear to es-
tablish that network corporations, with the acquiescence of
their affiliates, have adopted and pursued practices in televi-
sion program procurement and production through which they
have progressively achieved virtual domination of television
program markets. The result is that the three national network
corporations not only in large measure determine what the
American people may see and hear during the hours when
most Americans view television but also would appear to have
unnecessarily and unduly foreclosed access to other sources of
programs. 26
In 1970, after much debate, the FCC found its concerns were
valid, and accordingly, promulgated the syndication and finan-
cial interest rules.27
Subsequent to the FCC action, the Department of Justice
looked into the dominant market power of the Networks. 28 As
a result of suits instituted by the Department of Justice, the
Networks entered into consent decrees which dictated even
greater restrictions on Network business practices. 29 Gener-
ally, the consent decrees enjoined the Networks from purchas-
ing certain financial interests in independently produced
shows, set limits on the number of in-house Network-produced
programs and controlled both the timing of negotiations be-
tween the Networks and independent program producers and
the terms of agreements between them. Many of the consent
decree provisions are effective for only a limited number of
years.3 °
In 1977, the FCC once again chose to study these practices.3 1
25. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, No-
tice of Proposed Rule Making, 45 F.C.C. 2146 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Notice of Pro-
posed Rule Making].
26. Id. at para. 4.
27. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.658(j), (k).
28. Notice, supra note 1, at para. 7.
29. United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978), aId mem., No. 77-3381
(9th Cir. Apr. 12, 1978), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3186 (1979); United States v. CBS, Inc.,
Civil No. 74-3599-RJK (C.D. Cal. July 3, 1980), reprinted in 45 Fed. Reg. 34,463 (1980);
United States v. ABC, Inc., Civil No. 74-3600-RJK (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14,1980), reprinted in
45 Fed. Reg. 58,441 (1980).
30. See cases cited supra note 29.
31. See generally In re Commercial Television Network Practices and the Ability
of Station Licensees to Serve the Public Interest, Notice of Inquiry, 62 F.C.C.2d 548
(1977).
No. 31
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In its findings, the FCC special staff recommended repeal of
the syndication and financial interest rules.3 2 Opponents of re-
peal argued that the original justifications for the regulations
were still valid. Therefore, an understanding of Network domi-
nance in the 1960's is crucial to comprehending why the FCC
adopted the Rules.
B. The Three Networks
In the 1960's, when the FCC was considering the adoption of
the Rules, the Networks were the dominant force in program
access.33 In 1970, after an extensive study of the television in-
dustry, the FCC noted,
[ojnly three organizations control access to the crucial prime
time evening television schedule. In the top 50 markets, which
are the essential base for independent producers to market
programs outside the network process, they are at such a seri-
ous disadvantage that prime time first run syndicated program-
ming has virtually disappeared.34
The FCC hoped the adopted rules would open access for new
producers in both prime time syndication and network televi-
sion production,3" diminish network control over program
availability36 and allow stations to fulfill their public duty of
broadcasting programs that better reflect the needs and inter-
ests of the community.3 7 In writing the Rules, the FCC incor-
porated three major objectives: "1) enhancing the profitability
of program producers; 2) restraining or diminishing the net-
works' bargaining power, allegedly derived from their control
over access to affiliated stations and employed to extract syndi-
cation and other financial interest from producers; and
3) preventing networks from favoring programs in which they
had these interests. '38 This framework was the cornerstone for
32. See Notice, supra note 1, at para. 31.
33. Notice of Proposed Rule Making, supra note 25, at para. 8 (1965).
34. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Re-
port and Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 382, 394 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Report and Order].
35. Id. at para. 23.
36. Id. at paras. 21-27.
37. Id. at para. 26.
38. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, AN ANALYSIS OF TELEVISION PROGRAM
PRODUCTION, ACQUISITION AND DISTRIBUTION IN NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY, JU-
RISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 725 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 2 FCC NET-
WORK INQUIRY STAFF].
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the adoption and preservation of the Rules. 39
III
The Effect of the Rules on the Producers
and Networks
A. The Cost of Program Development
The Networks claim that the Rules promote inefficiencies in
program development risk sharing.' This theory assumes that
program development is a risky business. For example, an in-
ternal NBC study of its development successes and failures
claims that the practice of choosing which shows to buy for
prime time programming from independent producers is an ex-
pensive undertaking.4 First, a producer will "pitch" an idea
for a proposed show to the Network development department.
If the idea has the potential to become a financially viable pro-
gram, the Network will then commission the producer to write
a script for a pilot show or demo.' The script will be produced
by the independent producer with funds made available by the
Network. However, "[f]ew scripts ever become pilots. Even
fewer pilots turn into series. '4 3 Even fewer shows last the
three to four seasons necessary for them to become a success-
ful syndicated program.4
Because of the high failure rate of pilots, demos and series,
development is inherently very risky. Of the 105 pilots and de-
mos NBC financed between 1979 and 1982, only twenty-one of
these shows made the Network schedule.45 In two instances, a
series was based on two or more pilots or demos.46 Six series
were cancelled in their first year.47 Seven more are presently
in their first year, and undoubtedly a number of them will be
39. Id. at 726.
40. NBC Comments, supra note 15; at 119.20; BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 28;
BROADCASTING, Jan. 24, 1983, at 37; HOLLYWOOD REPORTER, Jan. 18, 1983, at 36. A pilot is
a one time produced version of a proposed T.V. show. Presumably upon viewing it the
Network will be better able to decide if it should invest in the production of the series
for a T.V. season. A demo is a short version of a pilot.
41. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 112.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 599.
45. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 113.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 114.
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cancelled before they achieve potential syndication value .4
NBC spent $75 million during this period to develop eighty-one
pilots. 49
Opponents of repeal argue that development is just a cost of
doing business and is not as risky as, for example, financing a
Broadway play.50 This analogy is tenuous at best. For a pro-
ducer of Broadway plays, development costs are similarly a
cost of doing business. If one agrees that the risk of failure is
greater in the live theatre, then the profits of success should
likewise be greater. Otherwise, the producer would invest his
development dollars in another medium.
Still, opponents of repeal support their position that develop-
ment is just a cost of doing business by noting that once a show
commitment is made, the independent producer can obtain
capital to finance the production of his show.5 The smaller in-
dependent producer can affiliate with the major motion picture
studios or larger independent producers for financial help.52 In
fact, the Networks often require such an arrangement.53 Thus,
the argument follows, if risk capital is available, then the risk is
being taken by those individuals who want to share in it.54 The
independent producer can look to many studios and producers
for support, while there are only three networks.55 Therefore,
the greater number of options available to the independent
producer, the more efficiently risk is spread. 6
B. Efficient Risk Sharing
A characteristic of television production is that the producer
will incur substantial costs at the start of production. Gener-
ally, the licensing fee paid by the Network to the producer for
his prime time show does not cover production costs. 5  The
producer is forced to produce his programs at a deficit using
outside funds to make up the difference.5 8 The amount of
48. Id.
49. Id. at 113.
50. ICF REPORT, supra note 13, at paper 1, 1-26.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 1-27.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1-26 to 1-27.
56. Id.
57. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 728; Report and Order, supra
note 34, at para. 10.
58. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 728.
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money the producer must supply above the Network licensing
fee proceeds represents the risk which the producer is willing
to take in return for the possibility of sharing in the rewards.59
A producer who is not willing to take this risk will look for a
financier who will pay a premium to purchase the risk and the
possible rewards.60 Some producers may wish to sell only a
portion. The exact allocation of risks and rewards between the
producer and Networks depends on several factors.6'
Assuming that the Networks are free to assume the risk and
to share in the accompanying rewards, three major factors will
determine the allocation:
1) the willingness of the parties to assume all or part of the
risk; 2) the ability of the Networks, large independent produ-
cers, and major studios to spread the potential losses over a
portfolio of shows, so that successes will balance losses; and,
3) the financial ability of the producer to shoulder some of the
risk.62
At times when the Networks are averse to assuming risk,
they will offer the producer a premium to retain it.63 The Rules
force the producer to find another risk bearer or assume more
of it himself.64 If the show is a success, the producer will be in
a better position than if he transferred risk to the Network for a
greater licensing fee. This result occurs because when one
party is risk-averse, the bearer of the risk receives a monetary
premium for assuming the risk.6" However, if the show is not a
success and syndication revenues are small or nonexistent, the
producer would have been better off if he had transferred the
risk.
Where revenues are uncertain and neither party is averse to
assuming some risk, the Network licensing fees will be lower
than in the above situation, because payment will not reflect
the monetary enticement to transfer risk. 6 Thus, when risk
aversion is not a factor, the producer will be in the same posi-
tion whether he retained all his rights or transferred some risk
59. Id. at 616-22.
60. Id.
61. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 115; 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supTra
note 37, at 603-12.
62. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 115.
63. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 616-22.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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to the Networks for a higher licensing fee.67
Presently, the producer is forced to go to a large independent
producer or to the studios to find backers who will share in the
risk. "However, in the process of shifting risk to the suppliers,
the aggregate amount of risk taking is increased since the risk
pooling function of the network is reduced."68 Risk pooling
highlights the inefficiency of FCC regulation. A Network, due
to its financial size and portfolio, may feel it can successfully
cover losses with successes. The Networks have the "gateway"
power to television households, the control of program mix and
selection, and financial strength. Arguably, these characteris-
tics make the Networks the most efficient risk taker. Yet, the
Rules eliminate the Networks from the risk market, thus forc-
ing the transfer of risk and possibly raising the cost of
production.69
The Justice Department agrees with this view: "It is possible
that the rules, by precluding what may be the most efficient
risk spreading technique, to some extent add to production
costs."70 Furthermore, "the rules in their present form have no
justification to warrant even the relatively minor inefficiencies
they appear to cause."'" The network special inquiry staff
notes that if the suppliers are averse to bearing risks and the
Networks are efficient risk sharers, then "the effect of a ban on
network acquisition of rights that have uncertain value is to
raise the cost of program production."72 This ban hurts the
small and intermediate sized suppliers, because they do not
have the option to shift their risk to the Networks.7" Therefore,
the Rules which prevent the Networks from acquiring all risk
associated with the production of a program may create
inefficiencies.
IV
Balancing of Bargaining Power
In adopting the syndication and financial interest rules, the
67. Id.
68. Id. at 620.
69. Id.
70. Comments of the United States Department of Justice in BC Docket No. 82-345,
at 20 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Justice Comments].
71. Id. at 17.
72. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 622.
73. Id.
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FCC believed that the bargaining position of the small in-
dependent producer would improve. In enacting the syndica-
tion rule, the FCC claimed, "Relieved of the need to grant to
networks large portions of his broadcast profit, the producer's
ability to operate in the network television program market
will be greatly enhanced." 74 The theory was that left unregu-
lated, the Networks would abuse their market power and sys-
tematically deprive producers of their syndication rights as a
precondition for Network broadcast.75
In 1965, the FCC became concerned that the Networks would
totally dominate the production as well as distribution of T.V.
programming because of their ability to distribute programs
nationally.76 A Network broadcast of a show could expect to be
aired in most cities and towns in the United States. 77 Since
many of these markets have three or fewer stations in their
respective broadcast area, the formation of another Network
was unlikely.78 This gateway to three nationally intercon-
nected affiliate systems assured the Networks a superior bar-
gaining position.
A. The Networks' Financial Interest
In 1970, the FCC concluded, as a purported basis of fact, that
if the Networks could compete for syndication rights and a fi-
nancial interest in a show, the producer was compelled to
choose a Network for financial support if he wanted his show
aired. "[N] etwork judgment in choosing new programs is sub-
stantially influenced by their acquisition of subsidiary inter-
ests in the programs chosen. '79
This theory is no longer accepted, as shown by the report of
the FCC's Network Inquiry Staff (Network Inquiry Report ).8
The Networks are highly competitive with one another and if a
producer has a good show idea, the Networks will compete for
that potential show.
74. In re Amendment of Part 73 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations With
Respect to Competition and Responsibility in Network Television Broadcasting, Mem-
orandum Opinion and Order, 25 F.C.C.2d 318, para. 30 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Memorandum Opinion and Order].
75. Id.
76. Report and Order, supra note 34, at paras. 11-12.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at para. 21.
80. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 603.
No. 31
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The great show idea and its resulting program may be so val-
uable to the Networks because of scheduling/lead-in appeal
and potential viewership levels, that one or all three of the Net-
works may be willing to forego syndication rights to purchase
the program.81 A distinction must be made, however, between
small, intermediate, and large independent program suppliers.
It is unlikely that repeal of the Rules will have much effect on
the small or large program supplier's ability to retain syndica-
tion rights.82
The large independents and the major studios have a firm
foothold in the Networks' prime time schedules.83 The Net-
works are careful to keep their dominant suppliers of program-
ming happy.84 For example, if a Network does in fact cancel a
Warner Brothers show, it is likely to purchase a few pilots from
the studio so that a new Warner Brothers show may replace
the cancelled one.85
A Network cannot afford to offend its major sources of pro-
gramming, because after the initial production contract ex-
pires, the producer is usually free to take his proven show or
shows to another Network or broadcast outlet, a situation the
Networks do not like.88 As a result of their financial strength
and domination of market supply, it is not likely that the larger
program producers can be pressured into giving up their syndi-
cation rights to the Networks.
On the other hand, the small program supplier will have diffi-
culty retaining his syndication rights in any event. Presently, a
producer of one or two shows will affiliate with a large in-
dependent producer, usually by request of the Networks as a
precondition of Network sale.87 A small supplier who affiliates
with a large independent will usually "lay off" syndication
rights and total creative control.88 If the Networks are allowed
to enter this market, the small supplier will have a choice of
three more entities that will demand syndication rights for fi-
nancial help.
The impact of repeal, however, will be significant to the inter-
81. Id. at 369; NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 130.
82. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 331-33, 537, 538.
83. Id. at 331-33.
84. Id. at 366, 367, 371, 609, 610.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 609, 610.
87. Id. at 363-66.
88. Id. at 364.
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mediate-sized supplier of programming. If this producer has a
sought-after program idea, he may be able to retain his syndi-
cation right. The Networks will be three more potential buyers
for his product. Arguably, the greater the competition, the bet-
ter the possible deal the producer can negotiate. The producer
would have the option to shift his risk elsewhere for a higher
licensing fee.89 Furthermore, the Networks may be interested
in hiring such a producer to develop programs for them in an
employer/employee relationship. The Networks could guaran-
tee development dollars, salary and security. At a point where
the producer is successful enough, he will be in a position to
demand a share of the profits. Thus, because the Rules inef-
ficiently shift risk, the potential amount the producer can re-
ceive with the Rules in effect is less than if the Rules were
repealed.
B. The Networks Participate Indirectly with Syndication Revenues
The FCC reasoned that the Rules would prevent the Net-
works from gaining valuable rights from the independent
producer.90 The producer would become more financially in-
dependent because he would retain the profitable syndication
rights.91 Eventually, the producer's dependence on the Net-
work would be diminished:92 "[W]ith the expanded syndica-
tion market as a feasible alternative to network exhibition, his
bargaining position will be improved and he can be expected to
develop into a stable and continuing alternate source of pro-
grams and ultimately to compete for network time. '93 How-
ever, in 1980, in its Network Inquiry Report, the FCC
determined that the Rules did not affect the source of the Net-
works' bargaining power, and therefore, could not be expected
to diminish that power.94
The major reason the Network bargaining power has not di-
minished is that the Rules fail to change the Networks' posi-
tion as gatekeeper.95 Accordingly, the Networks continue to
89. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 17.
90. Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 74, at paras. 29-30.
91. Id.
92. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 9.
93. Report and Order, supra note 34, at para. 29.
94. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 732.
95. "Gatekeeper" refers to the Networks' ability to control access to the prime time
television schedule.
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exercise monopsony 96 powers in other ways.9' First, under the
Rules, a producer cannot bargain away his syndication rights.98
As a result, the Networks offer lower licensing fees because
they cannot purchase these rights. 9 Theoretically, the price
will be lowered by approximately the same amount of antici-
pated syndication revenues the Networks would have acquired
without the Rules in effect. 00 The licensing fee typically turns
out to be lower than production costs.'0' The producer is
forced to spend more money on production than is taken in
from network licensing fees and hope that syndication reve-
nues will be greater than the Networks anticipated. However,
there is no guarantee the show will ever be syndicated or that
syndication revenues will offset losses. Because the Rules pre-
vent the producer from opting to sell his syndication right to
the Networks, the producer must bear the additional costs or
find alternative ways of sharing or eliminating risk.
Second, the Networks can prevent syndication of a show by
signing contract provisions which prevent such syndication
during the network run of the show. 0 2 This limitation is se-
cured in a contractual right of exclusivity. 10 3 The Networks are
limited by the Justice Department's consent decrees from
making exclusivity clauses longer than four years as measured
from the airing of the first prime time episode. 10 4 After the ini-
tial contract term, a producer of a successful show can usually
bargain not to include an exclusivity clause in his net Network
contract. 0 5 Yet, such clauses are the rule rather than the
exception.
Additionally, a spin-off provision is contained in many pro-
duction contracts. 6 The producer agrees in advance that the
96. Monopsony is "[a] condition of the market in which there is but one buyer for
a particular commodity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 908 (5th ed. 1979).
97. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 732.
98. Id. at 607.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 728.
102. Id. at 469-72.
103. A contractual right of exclusivity entitles the Network to an exclusive right to
broadcast the programs in the television series. By holding this right, the Networks
can prevent broadcasts in other dayparts, cable systems and other competitive forms
of distributions. See 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 469-73.
104. United States v. NBC, 449 F. Supp. 1127 (C.D. Cal. 1978), affid mem., No. 77-3381
(9th Cir. Apr. 12, 1978), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3186 (1979).
105. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 609, 610.
106. Id. at 473.
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Network will have all rights to any spin-off shows (i.e., a new
T.V. series based on characters from a continuing series), or at
least a right of first refusal for a given number of years.0 7 A
renewal option clause, another common contract provision,
typically lasts for five years. 10 8 Although licensing fees are
often renegotiated before the end of the option years, they do
prevent a show from moving over to another Network.10 9 Thus,
the value of these clauses is their ability to prevent losses by
show defections or competing spin-off series.1 0 Therefore, the
producer's inability to bargain his syndication rights away has
not increased his bargaining power. Unless the FCC is pre-
pared to limit the use of these types of contract clauses, the
Rules will make no difference in the television marketplace
power balance.
C. The Rules Do Not Promote Program Diversity or Quality
A long-time fundamental goal of the FCC is to increase pro-
gram diversity."' In 1970, the FCC claimed that greater compe-
tition between the producer and the Networks would increase
the number and types of shows produced." 2 The FCC con-
cluded that the Rules would give the producer a competitive
chance because the Networks could no longer favor shows in
which they had a financial stake." 3 This competitive chance
would translate into greater revenues at the producer level,
and thus would stimulate ventures into novel areas of pro-
gramming,"14 such as first-run syndicated programs. Even as-
suming that the Rules have had the effect of spreading wealth
from the Networks to the producer, there is no evidence that
this transfer of wealth promotes diversity or quality.
There are two major reasons why the Rules do not achieve
these goals. First, the Rules do not increase competition in the
production market. There have always been many suppliers
who have tried to sell their ideas to the Networks. 15 Even op-
ponents of repeal concede that the competition is fierce.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 467, 609.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 610.
111. Report and Order, supra note 34, at para. 21.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 327-33.
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"Turnover remains very high; barriers to entry seem small
.... This competitive and wide-open market is of great bene-
fit to creative talent.""' 6 Prime time programs produced by
nonaligned independents have remained constant since the
Rules were introduced. 117
For the most part, it is the game shows and magazine format
programs which have emerged. 1 8 These first-run syndicated
shows usually appear in the 7:30 or 8:00 p.m. half-hour time
slot." 9 The credit for their emergence does not rest with the
syndication and financial interest rules. Rather, the prime
time access rule, also enacted in 1970, is responsible for the in-
crease of first-run syndicated shows. 20 The hoped-for spillover
effect of innovative quality prime time shows into syndication
markets has had limited success.' 2' One such example is Uni-
versal's Operation Prime Time. These first-run syndicated
prime time offerings closely resemble their Network counter-
parts; unfortunately, without a guaranteed nationwide affiliate
system in place, these programs have had difficulty raising suf-
ficient advertising revenues to justify their continued
production. 22
It has been argued that a producer retaining his syndication
rights will spend more money on his productions because he
has a vested interest in their continued marketability. 123 This
greater production expenditure is supposed to translate into
greater quality.
Quality, in the FCC sense, means the creation of innovative
show alternatives which might not have mainstream appeal. 24
An increase in production expenditures is tangential to the
creation of quality programming because originality, ingenuity
and creativity are not necessarily expenditure sensitive.12 For
instance, public broadcasting programs, which many consider
to be quality productions, are generally produced for less
money than their network counterparts. Since the Rules in no
116. ICF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1-29.
117. Id.
118. HOLLYWOOD REP., Feb. 24, 1983, at 3-39; 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra
note 38, at 736.41.
119. Id.
120. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 413-22, 736.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 439-43.
123. Id. at 618-19.
124. Report and Order, supra note 34, at para. 7.
125. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 726, 515, 516.
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way benefit a producer who chooses this route of production,
they therefore have no bearing on the ultimate program
choices of the producer and broadcaster.'2 6 In fact, the Net-
works that can more easily spread losses might be more willing
to gamble on quality shows. One example, Hill Street Blues,
initially did not generate enough advertising revenue to even
cover the Network's licensing fee. Hence, it can be argued that
the financially weaker producer is more likely to risk the devel-
opment of a quality program in a situation where he can offer
to sell some or all of his risk to a Network in exchange for his
syndication right.
The second and probably more significant reason the Rules
do not promote diversity and quality is that they fail to change
the Networks' position as gatekeeper. The Networks will only
accept those shows that fit into their programming sched-
ules. 2 ' Typically, the Networks work closely with a producer
after his script is ordered and exercise an extensive amount of
creative control. 128 Furthermore, even if the Rules do stimu-
late more ideas initially, the subsequent effect of Network han-
dling will reshape these ideas into programs that will fit the
Network schedule. Therefore, as long as there are only three
Networks, the amount of diversity at the script/pilot stage will
remain irrelevant. Ironically, a side effect of this show homog-
enization may reduce diversity. If the Rules do encourage
more rapid and widespread syndication of off-network pro-
gramming, diversity will diminish as the more profitable re-
runs are broadcast in lieu of first-run syndicated programs. 12 9
V
Do the Rules Create a Bargaining Imbalance?
The greatest threat to the Networks' dominance is the tech-
nology revolution. Due to the cable explosion, there may well
be more than three Networks. Opponents of the Rules claim
that superstations and pay T.V. systems have such great ac-
cess to American households that they are in effect "networks"
and are in competition with the traditional "free" broadcast
Networks. 130 Many of these new broadcast systems are com-
126. Id. at 726, 727.
127. Id. at 367-72.
128. Id. at 356-72.
129. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 16.
130. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 28, 29.
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peting for the same original programming ideas, theatrical mo-
tion pictures, sporting events, advertising dollars and
viewers.' 3'
The most successful advertising-supported cable network is
WTBS, Ted Turner's superstation.132 The superstation is dis-
tributed via satellite to cable systems throughout the United
States. WTBS has over twenty-three million subscribers.'33
The largest pay supported network is Home Box Office (HBO)
with over eleven million subscribers. 34 It is estimated that ba-
sic cable service reaches thirty-five percent of the nation's total
number of homes with television. This represents some
twenty-nine million homes. 35 Pay service, which charges an
additional fee beyond basic cable service, features predomi-
nantly theatrical films, sports, and special interest program-
ming and reaches in excess of 14.5 million homes.'36 The
growth of cable since 1970, when the Rules were adopted, has
been extraordinary. The number of homes subscribing to
cable has increased 455%.137 These facts illustrate a changing
television market.
A. Pay Services Have a Competitive Advantage
The Networks have complained that the Rules prevent them
from competing with other broadcast outlets.'38 The Networks
argue that since they cannot bargain for non-network reve-
nues, they cannot bid competitively against pay television sup-
pliers which are able to invest more because of syndication
and other non-network profits.'39 The Federal Trade Commis-
sion supports this position: "network attempts to exercise
market power would be limited by the growing number of new
distribution technologies."'" Furthermore, the Commerce De-
partment has warned that "the restrictions placed on risk and
reward sharing might make the Networks 'unable to compete
131. Id. at 34-50.
132. CABLEVISION, Nov. 29. 1982, at 117.
133. Id.
134. CABLEVISION, Nov. 15, 1982, at 121.
135. CABLEVISION, Jan. 10, 1983, at 97.
136. DONALDSON, LUFKIN & JENRETTE, INDUSTRY VIEWPOINT: CABLE 1982 (1970-1975);
CABLEVISION, Jan. 10, 1983, at 97, 163.
137. CABLEVISION, Jan. 10, 1983, at 163.
138. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 139, 140.
139. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 22.
140. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 29.
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effectively with other program distributors and exhibitors who
enjoy the ability to participate as full partners' in program
production."' 4'
For example, let us assume that HBO, a pay service, spends
ten cents an hour per subscriber on programming during
prime time. HBO, with eleven million subscribers, can afford
to spend $1.1 million per hour regardless of the amount of ac-
tual viewers. The advertising-supported Networks spend less
per viewer but because they have larger potential audiences,
can afford to spend more per hour in prime time programming
as long as their average audience tunes in. Let us further as-
sume that, with an average audience, the Networks can afford
to spend $1.2 million per hour during prime time. If HBO can
generate more than $100,000 in syndication or other markets for
the one hour series for which the Networks and HBO are bid-
ding, then HBO can offer the producer a higher licensing fee.
As HBO adds subscribers or the Networks lose viewers, HBO
will be able to increase licensing fees to the point where the
producer will make a greater profit by selling his syndication
rights to HBO. The Networks, unable to recoup some of the
licensing fee loss in syndication markets, will be forced out of
competition for the "best" programming. Consequently, the
"best" programming may no longer be initially available to the
public on traditional free television.
The pay T.V. services all basically provide the same theatri-
cal movies to subscribers." By adding a series, the pay serv-
ices will increase subscriber loyalty as well as build an
independent personality. Presently, the pay services are offer-
ing first-run traditional program series to subscribers, such as
new episodes of the ex-Network series Paper Chase. Accord-
ing to a president of a pay cable network, "[T] he key to Show-
time's future is series."'43 It must be realized that these pay
services are often owned by the very companies that finance
the program's production. Showtime is owned by a partner-
ship of movie studios that produces a large percentage of the
Networks' present prime time offerings.' Therefore, a pay
service or its studio owner can collect revenues from all ancil-
141. Id.; see also ICF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1-30 to 1-46.
142. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 34, 35.
143. VAiETY, Apr. 28, 1982, at 75, 88.
144. VAMETY, May 12, 1982, at 450, 461; WaU St. J., Nov. 8, 1983, at 1, 24.
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lary markets and thus outbid the regulated Networks for the
top shows.
Another example of the Networks' inability to compete is
demonstrated by the inability of NBC's parent corporation,
RCA, to compete effectively in the videodisc industry.'45 The
Rules restrict RCA's ability to develop programming in new
technologies by "preventing RCA from acquiring syndication
profit share in outside-supplied programs that it helps fi-
nance."'14 6 RCA is also hampered in the distribution of pro-
grams it produces itself.'47 Yet, as mentioned in previous
sections, since the producer can only receive a fair value for
the additional rights he gives up, "sales to non-networks are
not inherently advantageous simply because these purchasers
can buy syndication rights."'48 The main fear is that eventually
the "best" programming will only be available to those people
who can afford to pay for services like HBO and Showtime' 49
B. Other Technologies Are Increasing Diversity
One assumption on which the FCC based the Rules was that
the "American commerce and industry will support greater di-
versity of program and program sources than presently are
represented in network schedules."' 50 The assumption was
correct; however, the Rules did not effect the change. New
technologies have increased diversity and provided program
suppliers with new avenues to sell their program ideas. Since
1970, the Networks' market share has dropped significantly,
corresponding to the rise in cable and other new program dis-
tribution technologies.'5 Frederick Pierce, President and
Chief Operating Officer of ABC, predicts that the Networks'
share of the television audience will "dip to 60-70% by 1990. ''152
This audience drop will reflect the fact that viewers are tuning
into their pay services during prime time. Furthermore, the
exposure of movies on pay T.V. diminishes the potential audi-
ence share for subsequent Network broadcasts. 3
145. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 29.
146. Id. (quoting RCA).
147. Id.
148. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 23.
149. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 9.
150. Report and Order, supra note 34, at para. 36.
151. HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 3, 1983, at 29.
152. Id.
153. Bus. WK., Feb. 21, 1983, at 78-89.
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These pay services include: subscription television (STV);' 54
Multipoint Distribution Services (MDS);15 5 Satellite Master
Antenna Television (SMATV); 156 Low Power Television
(LPTV), 57 and Direct Broadcasting Satellite (DBS).' 58 These
new types of broadcast distribution will continue to chip away
at the Networks' market share and thus their dominance;
"[a] ny attempt by a single network to reduce the price paid to
its program suppliers would lead to a shift of suppliers to the
other two networks or other distribution systems."'15 9 Thus,
the changing nature of the industry places in question the use
of the syndication and financial interest rules as a mechanism
to achieve FCC policies.
VI
Impact of the Elimination of the Rules on
Independent Television Stations
The strongest argument in favor of retention of the Rules is
that repeal would be disastrous to independent television sta-
tions. The success of independent television stations (in-
dependents) has been astounding in recent years. In 1973, the
eighty-eight independents achieved a total broadcast income
of $6.7 million. 6 ° In 1978, with an additional thirteen stations,
their income exceeded $154 million.' 6 ' According to the FCC In-
quiry Report, increases in national and local spot advertising
expenditures helped independents obtain greater advertising
154. Subscription television consists of "[s] crambled signals that are transmitted
by an over-the-air station to viewers who have equipped their television sets with spe-
cial decoders. Subscribers pay a fee to receive the broadcast every month and a fee to
lease the decoder." ICF REPORT, supra note 13, at 4.
155. Multipoint Distribution Services are the "[s] hort distance, line-of-sight trans-
mission of one channel of TV programming to selected locations." Id. at 2.
156. Satellite Master Antenna Television "offers services through the use of an-
tenna systems installed on multiple-dwelling units which transmit satellite-fed pro-
gramming and local television broadcasts." Id. at 3.
157. Low Power Television refers to 'TV stations which the FCC permits to operate
at low power without observing the standards of operation that apply to full power
stations." Id. at 2.
158. Direct Broadcasting Satellite refers to "[a] satellite which delivers a signal di-
rectly to an earth station supplied by the viewer." Id. at 1.
159. Syndication, Financial Interest Comments High-Stake Rulemaking, BROAD-
CASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 29 (quoting the FTC).
160. FCC, 40TH ANNuAL REPORT 124-26 (1974).
161. Federal Communications Commission, T.V. Broadcast Financial Data Table 3
(1978); see 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 428-29.
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income;'62 "[t ]he most direct beneficiaries of this increased ad-
vertiser demand have been the local stations, both affiliates
and independents."' 63 Independents have been able to capture
these advertising revenues because they have competed suc-
cessfully with Network affiliates for audience share, within cer-
tain broadcast periods of the day. Between 5:00 and 8:00 p.m.,
the independents consistently have counter-programmed their
most popular shows, off-network programs, against the less
popular local and national news on Network-owned stations
and affiliates.'64 During the half-hour after national news and
before prime time, the prime time access rule prevents local
affiliates from broadcasting off-network programs. 65 It is dur-
ing the 5:00 to 8:00 p.m. period that independents generate a
large percentage of their income. This rapid growth in the in-
dependents' market share, the increased demand for limited
broadcast advertising space, and the prime time access rule
have greatly enhanced the profitability of independent sta-
tions. Repeal opponents claim that gains by independents may
be severely curtailed.166 It is argued that without the Rules the
Networks will: (1) acquire syndication rights and warehouse
off-network programs; (2) favor their affiliates when selling
syndication licenses; (3) increase advertising rates for all
programming because the independents' market share will di-
minish; and, (4) as a result, force independents to curtail
broadcast hours or go out of business.'67
A. Warehousing Is Against the Networks' Best Interest
Opponents of the repeal have stated in no uncertain terms
that if the Networks are allowed to syndicate and purchase fi-
nancial interests in television shows, the Networks will ware-
house-delay program entry into the syndication market. 68 The
practice of holding back possible syndication entrants until
their value will not threaten prime time Network programs
would severely limit the main program source of the independ-
162. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 427-28.
163. Id. at 428.
164. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 28-31; 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF,
supra note 38, at 428, 429.
165. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 253-55.
166. ICF REPORT, supra note 13, at iii.
167. Id. at paper 2, 1-1.
168. Id. at 1-2.
[Vol. 6
PRIME TIME FOR A CHANGE?
ents' profitable 5:00 to 8:00 p.m. time slots.'69 This assertion as-
sumes that a delay in syndication entry will lower the
popularity of an off-network series and thus lower audience
share.170 Because independents generate a large percentage of
their profits from these off-network programs,'171 as audience
share goes down, so do the independents' advertising reve-
nues. If the independents become financially fragile, they will
not be able to offer diverse programming to the public. This
result is contrary to the FCC's goals of promoting diversity and
the financial security of independents.
Network control of subsidiary interests in a program series,
particularly syndication rights, does raise the risk that the Net-
works can determine the timing of the release for syndication,
thus affecting the number of off-network programs available to
independents. Furthermore, the Networks could set condi-
tions on the use of off-network programs so that the programs
would be less of a threat to Network programming.171 This ar-
gument, however, has three basic flaws. First, the Networks
must be sufficiently able to prevent access of the independents
to a majority of off-network programs. 73 Otherwise, the in-
dependents will purchase shows from other off-network pro-
gram syndicators. Presently, there are a substantial number of
off-network programs for sale. 74 Since it takes approximately
three years for a show to have syndication value, the Networks
could not start warehousing for at least three years after re-
peal. "Thus, the networks can continue to influence the entry
of series into syndication by exercising their exclusivity rights
rather than by retaining syndication rights.' 75
The FCC inquiry into the 1968 syndication market indicated
"that none of the networks controlled a sufficient portion of the
syndication rights to programs to exercise market power."' 76
Opponents of repeal contend that FCC investigations during
this time prevented the Networks from exercising market
169. Id. at 1-1.
170. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 28, 29; NBC Comments, supra note 15, at
213.
171. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 28, 29; NBC Comments, supra note 15, at
213.
172. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 732; see Justice Comments,
supra note 70, at 36.
173. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 732-33.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 733.
176. Id.
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power.177 It is unlikely, however, that after repeal the FCC and
Justice Department would allow the Networks to drive the in-
dependents out of business.
A second flaw in the warehousing theory is that the Rules do
not presently prevent this behavior. As noted earlier, through
exclusivity clauses in Network contracts, the Networks can
effectively prevent or delay the entry of shows into the syndi-
cation market.178 The Networks can also prevent syndication
entry by: (1) cancelling a show before a sufficient number of
episodes have been produced; (2) lowering quality of first-run
programs, thereby lowering syndication appeal; (3) adjusting
Network schedules so that a larger percentage of first-run Net-
work shows will not be suitable for the family oriented off-net-
work market; and (4) purchasing syndication rights and re-
running the shows during the daytime, thus diluting the value
of the program to the independents.'79 The Networks have not
gone to these extremes, probably because such practices are
unprofitable. Although Network warehousing is undesirable,
the Rules should not be retained to prevent an activity they
have been unable to control.
A third flaw in the warehousing theory is that if one Network
decides not to warehouse, the strategy is severely undercut.
For instance, if Network A is in desperate need of cash, it may
decide to syndicate its shows for cash flow reasons. If the
other two Networks do not follow suit, Network A will have a
windfall because it can demand higher fees due to the limited
supply of off-network programs. Since the overall need for off-
network shows is finite, one network may be able to alleviate
the shortage sufficiently so that warehousing would be ineffec-
tive. Thus, market forces are an effective deterrent to potential
Network warehousing.
Warehousing of valuable syndication rights might not pro-
duce the Networks' allegedly desired goal of less competition
from independents. "Today, it would be difficult for the Net-
works to acquire even the small share (of the syndication mar-
ket) that they had in the past, considering the dominant
position in off-network programming that the studios have es-
tablished .. . ."180 As long as there are either off-network or
177. ICF REPORT, supra note 13, at 6-6.
178. Id. at 6-7; see 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 37, at 732.
179. ICF REPORT, supra note 13, at 6-6.
180. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 212.
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other syndicated shows of equivalent value for sale, a Network
policy of warehousing would be a futile, expensive mistake.
Since the marketplace for new shows is very competitive and
the studios are financially strong, the Networks' advantage as
gatekeeper may be so insignificant that the producer may not
have to give up syndication rights at all.
It should be noted that syndication revenues are substantial.
A recent studio survey estimated that over a one year period,
the studios took in revenues of $300 million from the syndica-
tion of made-for-television programming, with a profit of over
$150 million.181 It is not clear whether Network advertising rev-
enue gains, due to the demise of competition from the in-
dependents, will be greater than potential syndication
revenues.
The Networks advance three other reasons why warehousing
would not occur.182 First, the value of syndication rights dimin-
ishes as the program gets older "since virtually all programs
lose popularity as they grow older."' 8 3 Therefore, withholding
shows might produce tremendous revenue losses. Second,
Networks would probably not own the entire syndication profit
share. Keeping a show from the syndication market would de-
prive the profit participants from syndication profits. There
would be great pressure from these participants to get pro-
grams into syndication. Third, assuming that warehousing
would lower the independents' audience share, there is no
guarantee that viewers and advertisers will turn to the Net-
works. Rather, new broadcast technologies may capture this
viewing public and the all important "lead in" avenue to the
prime time schedules.
Historically, Networks have scheduled their most successful
shows in the early part of prime time, hoping to "lead in" and
keep the viewer throughout the evening. 84 This has been a
successful programming strategy. By encouraging the in-
dependents' viewers to switch to alternate sources of program-
ming, the Networks could conceivably lower their entire prime
time audience share, thus lowering their revenues. Since the
above arguments are based on what the Networks may or may
not do in the wake of repeal, the fear of warehousing is realis-
181. Id. at 141 (quoting Booz, ALLEN & HAMILTON INC. REPORT 1982).
182. Id. at 213-14.
183. NBC Comments, supra note 15, at 213.
184. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 369.
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tic. Yet market forces and the growth of new technologies and
their ability to purchase original first-run program series may
very well make warehousing a suicidal strategy.
B. Networks Will Not Favor Their Affiliates
In 1970, the FCC believed that if the Networks "are pre-
vented from operating as syndicators or from sharing in the
profits from distribution by others in the domestic syndication
market, there will no longer be any inducement to choose for
network exhibition... programs in which they have acquired
other rights."'85 Although the Rules have indirectly achieved
this narrow objective, it is not clear that the Networks, in fact,
ever favored shows in which they had a financial interest.'86
One study on the FCC Rules has noted that, statistically, Net-
works were more likely to cancel shows in which they had a
financial stake than those in which they did not.18 7
The FCC was also afraid that Networks would favor their af-
filiates in syndication sales. 188 The FCC raised an argument
based on conflict of interest, stating that "[the Networks] are
in the position of selling programs to independent stations in
competition with their own network programs on affiliated sta-
tions, and they compete against independent syndicators in
the affiliated-station market where they have an advantage due
to their permanent relationship with the stations.'' 89 The FCC
based this assertion on the fact that, in 1970, of the top fifty
markets which reach over seventy-five percent of the available
audience, only fourteen have one or more independent VHF 9 °
stations. 9' VHF stations have greater viewership than the
more numerous UHF 192 stations because of better reception by
viewers, and simpler channel tuning. VHF stations also have
lower operating costs for broadcast transmission. 193 Therefore,
to reach an adequate audience the syndicator must turn to net-
185. Report and Order, supra note 34, at para. 29.
186. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 733.
187. See Crandall, The Economic Effect of Television-Network Program Ownership,
14 J.L. & ECON. 385, 403-06 (1971).
188. Report and Order, supra note 34, at para. 30.
189. Id. at 394.
190. VHF signifies Very High Frequency television (channels 2-13).
191. Report and Order, supra note 34, at para. 7.
192. UHF signifies Ultra High Frequency television (channels 14-83).
193. 1 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, NEW TELEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY,
JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 64-78 (1980).
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work affiliates for market penetration. "Not only is there the
natural tendency of an affiliate to do more business with its
dominant supplier, but the program distribution process is
much simpler via a network."' 94 Yet, at the time the Rules
were adopted this situation did not exist. 95 For example, in
1964 six major studios controlled 67.6% of the total domestic
syndicated dollar sales.
96
Ironically, the Networks might have incentives not to favor
their affiliates. The Networks' revenues depend on audience
share. Network affiliates are not required to broadcast
(clear) 9 7 each Network offering. When an affiliate does not
clear a Network show, the Network audience is smaller, and a
smaller share of the audience means smaller advertising reve-
nues because advertisers pay according to the number of view-
ers the program attracts. The Network Inquiry Report found
that clearance of Network programs is greatest during prime
time and the presence of an independent VHF station in-
creases the clearance of a VHF affiliate during other times in
the day.98 If these findings are accurate and the Networks
want to increase their clearance rate and thus their share of
the market, they might want to encourage the stability of in-
dependents and prevent their affiliates from showing syndi-
cated off-network programs during non-prime time hours.
Therefore, it is unlikely that, given the freedom to syndicate,
the Networks will act any differently from the way they did
before the Rules were adopted.
C. Effect on Advertising Rates
Opponents of repeal have strongly argued that advertising
rates will go up if the Networks re-enter the syndication
field.' 99 All parties agree that when advertising rates go up, the
public indirectly pays the increase through higher product
prices. This threat of increasing advertising rates may be ac-
complished in two ways.
First, if a show producer is able to sell his syndication and
194. Report and Order, supra note 34, at para. 7.
195. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 733.
196. Id. at 510-11.
197. Clearance is "[a] station's agreement to broadcast the program being fed by
the network during a given time slot." ICF REPORT, supra note 13, glossary at 1.
198. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 262-63.
199. ICF REPORT, supra note 13, at 1-3.
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financial interest rights, he can expect to receive higher licens-
ing fees than is presently possible.20 0 This argument assumes
that the Networks will pass on the added licensing fee cost to
the public by demanding greater advertising revenues. 20 1 Ini-
tially, the Networks will have greater expenditures because of
the time delay of syndication profits. Yet, the Networks should
have no problem borrowing funds secured by this valuable
property right.0 2 Thus, if the Networks are, in fact, the most
efficient risk holder and if the Networks have correctly esti-
mated syndication revenues, then the cost of programming
should go down rather than increase. Hence, the assumption
that the Networks will routinely demand higher advertising
revenues if they choose to pay higher licensing fees is
unfounded.
Second, it is argued that if, due to Network warehousing, in-
dependents cannot deliver the large audiences that the adver-
tisers desire, the advertiser will be forced to turn to the
Networks for exposure. Since advertising space is limited on
the Networks, the demand will exceed supply and prices will
go up.20 "[W]e are dealing with supply and demand of an ex-
tremely valuable commodity, the cost of which has been rising
at a rate out of proportion to the rest of the economy because
of insufficient supply. '204 Research by advertising agencies
has shown that where independents are strongest, spot adver-
tising costs are lowest.20 5 Thus, competition which increases
the supply of advertising time, has the effect of bringing adver-
tising costs down. This result is not surprising. Yet, this argu-
ment is valid only if the Networks in some way collude to force
the independents' audience share down.20 6
As discussed in earlier sections, it might be neither in the
Networks' best interests nor within their power to harm the
independents. Unlike during the 1970's, advertisers can now
turn to new broadcast media for exposure. The Association of
200. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 612-22.
201. BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 31.
202. The studios and other syndicators in this situation have been able to borrow
money. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 332, 333.
203. Thomas T. Ryan, Presentation of Association of National Advertisers' Position
With Regards to Financial Interest Rule, INTV Annual Convention in Los Angeles,
Cal., at 8, 9 (Jan. 18, 1983).
204. Id. at 8.
205. Id.; see also BROADCASTING, Jan. 31, 1983, at 31.
206. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 39.
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National Advertisers (ANA) does not disagree with this
point.20 7 The ANA still believes, however, that in the near fu-
ture the Networks will remain the dominant outlet and the
most efficient means for advertisers to effectively reach their
markets. °8 If new broadcast media can sufficiently increase
the supply of advertising space and are able to attract the de-
sired audience, then the supply argument will be severely un-
dercut. An alternative way to restrain the Networks, which
will prevent potential abusive Network practices at a lower
cost to society, may be achieved by balancing possible Net-
work abuses of market power with the inefficiencies of the syn-
dication and financial interest rules.
VII
Alternatives to the Syndication and Financial
Interest Rules
The Network Inquiry Report states that the Commission
must overcome two main obstacles if it hopes to achieve a ra-
tional approach in intervening in the network-supplier rela-
tionship.20 9 First, any attempt to restrict the Networks' use of
monopsony power in acquiring program rights must encom-
pass all of the avenues the Networks have to exercise this
power.210 Thus, the new rules should only regulate practices
which cannot be justified on the "basis of economic effi-
ciency. ' '21' Second, placing more profits in the hands of the
producer will not guarantee diversity; therefore, rules to regu-
late contract terms should not be based solely on the goal of
diversity.21 2 These guidelines will be difficult to follow when
constructing alternatives to the Rules.213
One possible alternative is to allow the Networks syndica-
tion rights only while the series is in first-run Network produc-
tion.214 Presumably, the Networks will pay higher licensing
fees for such a right, and thus be exposed to more risk.21 5 The
207. Ryan, supra note 203, at 11, 12.
208. Id.
209. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 762-63.
210. Id. at 761.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id.; Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 47.
214. Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 48.
215. Id. at 49.
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Networks will have the incentive to syndicate the show as
early as possible, because of the limited nature of the acquired
right. Although this will simultaneously give the Networks the
right to withhold programs, "they would be unable to control
enough programs at any one time to make a withholding strat-
egy profitable. '216 After prime time production is cancelled,
the Networks will be required to divest themselves of their lim-
ited financial interest.217 According to the Justice Department,
enforcement of such a rule would not be difficult.218
Another alternative is the extension of the prime time access
period.219 If a greater amount of high viewership time is re-
served for first-run syndicated shows, independent producers
will have a profit incentive to produce programs of network
quality. As the number of shows produced increases, costs will
come down because of greater production efficiencies, and this
extended access period will increase production of first-run
syndicated programs. 220 Critical to such a regulation will be
provisions prohibiting Network in-house production for the ex-
tended access period.22'
Some inefficiencies will arise from this rule. The new "ac-
cess period networks" will not have the promotional efficiency
of the Networks 222 nor the ability to spread risk over as large a
program schedule. The Networks, on the other hand, with a
smaller broadcast schedule, will lose their efficiencies of scale.
Prime time live news coverage will suffer because the Net-
works will have to ask for waivers to preempt the "access pe-
riod network" programming.223 Although an extended access
period appears to be workable, there are no guarantees that
the public will actually receive anything different from what
the Networks would have provided. Given the increased costs
of such a plan, with no guarantee of diversity, other options
may be more desirable.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 48.
218. Id.
219. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 765.
220. Id. at 764-65.
221. Id. at 765, 766.
222. Promotion inefficiencies arise because when the Networks have no financial
stake in a show's syndication revenue, they have no incentive to promote the show
through their prime time counterparts. Further, the Networks are not compensated
for any promotion that may in fact arise from the prime time counterpart's own
promotion.
223. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 763-68.
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A third option is to allow the Networks a minority financial
interest in a program with no control over syndication distribu-
tion.224 The Networks will be able to obtain profits from syndi-
cation and eliminate promotional inefficiencies. This option
might be particularly difficult to enforce. Through contract
provisions, the Networks may be able to retain control of syn-
dication distribution while appearing to have only a minority
interest.225 It is hoped that other minority interest holders will
complain to the FCC if such a practice is developed.
Many other options have been discussed: (1) to allow the
Networks to syndicate programs, yet require divestiture if they
do not exercise this option within a certain time period;226
(2) to allow purchase of syndication rights up to a certain per-
centage of programs (e.g., thirty-five percent) shown during
prime time;227 (3) to regulate the pilot process by limiting ex-
clusivity, options and spin-off clauses;228 and (4) to allow the
Networks to purchase a fixed financial interest in their pro-
grams "that would increase as their share of television viewers
decreases, which is expected to happen as a result of cable
competition. '229 Presently, the parties to the controversy are
attempting to reach a compromise. Many of these options
have been brought to the bargaining table, but no final accord
has yet been reached.230 Clearly, any compromise should pre-
vent the Networks from dominating the creative and distribu-
tion markets.
VIII
Conclusion
In sum, drastic changes in the television marketplace, and
questionable underlying assumptions indicate that it is time to
replace the syndication and financial interest rules. The threat
of the Networks' exercising monopoly power, in the wake of
repeal, illustrates the need for new regulations more carefully
constructed to prevent unwanted Network dominance. Al-
224. See Justice Comments, supra note 70, at 49-50.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 50.
228. 2 FCC NETWORK INQUIRY STAFF, supra note 38, at 763-79.
229. Wall St. J., Mar. 15, 1983, at 6, col. 2 (quoting James Quello, FCC
Commissioner).
230. BROADCASTING, Jan. 2, 1984, at 87; BROADCASTING, Jan. 9, 1984, at 39.
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though this article mentions only a few of the potential regula-
tory options, the FCC should enact some type of narrowly
focused syndication/financial interest rule contemporaneously
with repeal of the present Rules. Failure to do so would result
in the FCC taking a dangerous gamble: allowing the Networks
to police themselves. The ultimate fear is that without some
type of rule the Networks will change the way the present mar-
ket operates, and market forces alone will be unable to prevent
undesired Network practices.
